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EQUAL PROTECTION--FREE TEXTBOOKS 
This suit was instituted on behalf of black children 
attending public schools in Mississippi (and is supported 
by the Inc. Fund). The suit is against the state officials 
charged with management of the State's school textbook 
loan program. The suit c harges that the State is supporting 
efforts to withstand integration of Mississippi schools 
by making textbooks available on a free basis to the more 
than 100 private , racially-discriminatory, schools in the 
State , which were established in the mid and late '60s to 
provide an alternative for families who did not wish to 
send their children to recently integrated public schools. 
\
The three-judge ct held that the provision for making text-





violate the equal protection clause. 
The State of Mississippi adopted a program of free 
textbook provision for every child in the State in 1940. 
Since then books have been provided for children in 
public and private schools alike. When Mississippi 
schools were ordered integrated in 1964-65, it is undis-
puted that many localities responded by opening new private 
racially-discriminating schools. The appellees concede 
that there are over 100 schools in the state that were 
opened as an answer to integration. Indeed, an order by 
the Exec Sec of the Textbook Purchasing Bd to all school 
superintendents states that "we have many disturbed parents 
since 'ttlie court decisions. Many of them are going to organ-
ize private schools, and they are going to need books." 
The order instructs public school officials to allow 
students leaving the public schools to take their textbooks 
with them to the newly established private schools. 
The arguments on the question of the constitutionality 
of this provision, primarily, are as follows. 
(1) The federal courts have struck down the two 
p~imary previous means of assisting private schools 
established to avoi the effects of integration. Both 
@:uition grants an ax exemptions have been struck down 
as violative of the 14th Amendment because they constitute 
state support for programs seeking to perpetuate a dual 
-1.siwl-e./L 
system of publicAeducation. Appellants argue that the 
reasoning of these cases controls the instant case since 
it is another form of integration-avoidance assistance. 







that the effect of providing textbooks is so small as 
not to make any difference in terms of whether children 
remain in or leave the public school system, i.e., the aid 
program does not significantly encourage 
ination. 
discrim .. 
(2) The three-judge ct also argued that it was signifi-
cant that the state law establishing a program of free text-
books was not inspired by any racially discriminatory 
motive but by a benevolent motive to provide better 
education for every student in the State. The program was 
in existence long before the days of massive resistance. 
It was then, and is now, applied across the board to _.. 
religious, private, and public schools. Appellants 
counter that motive is not crucial when determining whether 
conduct by the state violates the 14th Amendment. They cite 
the Ct's language last Term in Wright v. City of Emporia 
in which the Ct said that "motivation is irrelevant" and 
that the Ct's focus must be on the effect. 
(3) The ct below also placed heavy reliance on Bd of 
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), in which this Ct 
upheld the NY textbook statute. NY loaned books free to 
children attending parochial schools. The Ct said that 
such a policy did not constitute an "establishment of 
religion" in violation of the First Amendment. Appellants 
argue that Allen is inapplicable since in that case the Ct 
} looked to whether the aid was given to children or whether 
\ it was given to the churches. In the case of deciding 
whether a state program constitutes state support for 





difference whether the state aids the schools or the students 
because in either event it is state assistance to main-
tain .. segregation. 
(41 Appellants focus considerable attention on the 
numerous cases from this Ct which have emphasized that it 
is the affirmative obligation of the state to seek to 
establish a unitary system. A passive program of teiR:tbook 
aid arguably contributes to the maintenance of a dual system. 
(5) The three-judge ct also points out that there 
would be considerable difficulty in deciding which schools 
would be barred from receiving aid if it had decided the 
case the other way. Appellants do not contend that parochial l\ 
--: . . i,.,t _ • 
schools must stop receiving aid. Nor do•~ attempt to 
bar private schools that are open to Blacks. It foc uses 
instead only on the schools opened after the major ct decisions 
requiring immediate integration which are all white and 
positively exclude blacks (of which there are 100+ presently 
receiving free books). 
(6) The three-judge ct also intimates that in its view 
there might be an argument that the whites in private 
racially discriminatorSy schools are being denied equal -protection if they are not permitted to receive the same 
benefits as other students. 
RECOMMENDATION 
I think the Ct should note probable jurisdiction. The 
issues raised are difficult and serious. Frankly, I have no 
solid idea at this point how I would decide the case. But 
I am not persuaded by the existing three~judge ct opinion. 





Allen, about the applicability of the tuition-grant cases 
and the tax exemption cases, and about the general language 
from other cases about the State's affirmative duties to 
achieve the dismantling of a dual school system in the 










LAH 2/20/73 . ~~A,,J{."-1,¼. -~ 
C1At..c1..,h/.1~ .. ,~t..t!W'.~-~ 
s ~ ~ \\ 
BENCH NOTE 
No. 72-77 
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I can recall few cases that have come before the 
Court in my brief tenure here that have come so heavily 
ladened with precedents--not all of them entirely consistent--
from several different areas of constitutional adjudication. 
In endeavoring to analyze this case I have identified 
four lines of cases that bear with some degree of import-
ance on this case. Those four lines are (1) the school 
desegregation decision from Brown I to Emporia with emphasis 
on the duty of school boards and state officials to dismantle 
dual school systems, (2) the state-aid-to-"private"-schools 
cases, including the cases running from the transferral of 
physical facilities to "private" schools through the cases 
striking down tuition grants and tax credits, all of whaich 






Court, (3) the state action cases involving state "encour-
agement"of private discrimination, primarily Wilmington 
Parking Authority and Reitman v. Mulkey, and (4) the 
establishment of religion/ free exercise cases, primarily 
Everson and Allen. Although I would like to write you a 
book on this case, I have concluded that it will be most 
expeditious at this time if I merely outline the primary 
analysis that I find controlling. I can address myself in 
a supplemental memo to any particular points of concern to 
you. 
I 
What we are trying to decide in this case is really 
the extent of a state agency's obligations with respect 
to the abolition of dual systems of public education. 
The State's duty is clear, the only question is whether 
the State's action in this case violated the letter or 
spirit of that duty. Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 
430, 437-38 (1968) is the source of the language repeatedly 
reaffirmed since then that the State is "clearly charged 
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be 
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated." The same proposition 
was stated negatively in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) 
when it said that "State support of segregated schools 
through any arrangement, management, funds, or property 
cannot be squared with the Amendment's command that no 
State shall deny to any person equal protection of the 
laws. " 






neither case involves the factual pattern involved in thi$ 
case in which, concedely, a unitary system is implemented 
for the public schools and the State is confronted with 
the response of massive white flight to private segregated 
academies in those districts having a substantial black 
student population. Having established the unitary public 
school system, how much farther does the State have to go? 
The answer lies in the spirit of Cooper, Green, Emporia, 
and Scotland Neck. The obligation on the State is to 
make desegregation work. And, realistically, desegregation 
cannot work if integration simply rre ans a •black" public 
school system and a "white" "private" school system. That 
is, if the goal of integration--genuine educational 
opportunity in a mixed environment--is to be realized, 
the State cannot support or encourage the establishment of 
segregated counterparts to the public schools. 
Your experiences on school boards, I know from our 
many conversations about Rodriguez, demonstrate one 
reason. When a struggling school district in a transitional 
period loses a significant percentage of its student 
population to private schools it also loses teachers, 
financial support, and the sustaining interest of parents 
with the wherewithall to make public education work. No 
school board committed to making integration work would 
willingly do anything to encourage or promote rejection of 
the public school system. This practical problem--loss 
of the influential and interested families--was one of 
the reasons why in Emporia and Scotland Neck refused to 






the face of a court-ordered integration order. (You joined 
,. 
in the CJ's opinion concurring in Scotland Neck in which 
he agreed that the proof demonstrated that the proposed 
plan to create a separate school system for the City of 
Scotland Neck "would tend to undermine desegregation efforts.•~ 
The second reason why the State may not encourage or 
assist the creation of seg academies is that in so doing, 
unavoidably, it places its approval on a program that 
must have an adverse psychological impact on the Negro 
"beneficiaries" of the new unitary system. Brown launched 
a battle for a single public school environment which would 
not allow disparate treatment and would not tolerate the 
historical stigma attached to the black. A school board 
dedicated to making integration work cannot at the same 
time undertake to facilitate the sort of mass exodus that 
occurred in some Mississippi districts. Many of these 
schools, it should be remembered, were set up inthe 
wake of Green and Alexander, decisions requiring only 
that mere freedom-of~choice was not enough. They were 
not massive busing orders. People were pulling their kids 
out of the schools entirely because they would be going to 
school with black children, not because they would be 
riding a bus. This same argument was approved by the 
majority in Emporia (407 U.S. at 466). The dissent, in which 
you joined, did not denigrate the problem but simply con-
cluded where the before-and-after percentages of blacks in 
the schools were so close it was ''speculative" and "un-
supported by common experience" to believe that the addition 






psychological difference. In the present case, though, 
we have a whodlly different situation. Here we have 
some districts that have beicome 100% black as a conse-
quence of the establshment of seg academies. If there is 
any bite left to the psychological argument, and it is 
what Brown was premised on, it must apply under these 
facts. 
The State's argument is that this is a policy which 
began in 1940 and 1942 and is one that has been consistently 
adherred to and is a benevolent, neutral policy. That 
argument was surely right prior to the mid and late-60's. 
But the change of circumstances in the fae of court-ordered 
integration makes a critical differences in the propriety 
of the State's policy. Before the days of integration the 
State had no constitutional duty to endeavor to promote 
a unitary system of public education. The mere existence 
of a neutral policy cannot override the greater constitutional 
obligation. There is no need to look into the State's 
purposes or its motives. All we need see is its effects. 
We don't know, and really have no way of knowing, whether 
i 
white flight would have been as pervasive If the State had 
ta~en a striong affirmative stand for public schools. But 
we do know that the State went out of its way, to the extent 
of issuing an order that the usual regulations with respect 
to textbooks be abrogated, to assure that the children 
abandoning the public educational system had ttheir books. 
Again, the "neutral and benevolent" policy argument was 
made and rejected in Emporia and the dissent's quarrel was 







The State argues, too, that the contribution it 
made ti racially discriminatory education was so slight 
as to have had no impact on the course of events in 
Mississippi. The DC said that the plaintiffs had failed 
to prove a but-for relationship. The State points out 
that books cost only about $6.00 per pupil per year. 
First of all, this liidi rationale is flatly inconsistent 
with the findings in two other recent Mississippi seg 
academy cases. In Coffey and again in Green (the tuition 
grant and tax exemption cases) the three-judge courts 
commented that the academies were run on the "thinnest 
financial bases." Second, it seems plain to me that books 
are an integral and pretty much indespensible aspect of 
public school education today. Schools are esentially 
"textbook oriented." Without the books the schools are 
ffelHi# really hamstrung. 
Again, the State's response is, if books are so im-
portant why did the Ct hold in Allen that statewide 
provision for school books to private--ejven religious--
schools did not constitute the "establishment" of religion. 
I think there are two reasons. First, there has always 
been a tension in religion cases between the establishment 
ajnd the free exercise clause. While the State can't 
promote or protect any particular religion, it can 
neither intefere with the uninhibited exercise thereof. 
To provide books for all but the religious schools might 
be viewed as singling out religious entites for disfavored 






This also explains tthe result in an obviously analagous 
situation. This Court has held that tax exemptions are 
proper for 1Hiii6di charitable contributions to religious 
institutions. Walz v. Tax Cornrn'r, 397 U.S. If# 644. At 
the same time it has held that tax exemptions may not be 
allowed to pe-sons who make "charitable" contributions to 
Mississippi's segregated academies. Green v. Connally, 
330 F. Supp 1150 (DCDC 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). 
Second, the religion cases have been caught up with 
the problem of excessive entanglements. See Lemon v. 
Kurtzman. The redeeming thing about bus transportation 
and school books is that a program can be administered 
providing those benefits which does not require the 
State's involvement in the day-to-day policy decisions of 
the church. There are no entanglement interests in the 
school cases. I do not think that Allen can be read as 
holding that it is OK to give textbooks because such a 
gift is somehow de minilmus. It is slimply a neutral, 
benevolent, and relatively easily administered system 
for providing a service to all the children, 
The State makes one other argument that deserves brief 
comment. It suggests that textbooks are just like providing 
police and fire protection, and sewarage and other municipal 
facilities to a private school. None of those services 
though has really anything to do with education. They 
are services provided to all in the municipality. More-
over they are not services that the State can afford to 
discontinue. It is in everyone's interest to have police 








provision id such services is hardly regarded as an 
endorcement of the school's programs. Textbooks, 
thoughi, are an integral entity in the educational 
process. It seems to me that when the State provides 
books it plces its impramatur on the school. At the 
least it materially assists the seg academies in 
the difficult process of creating a new school almost 
overnight. 
Apart from the school deseg~@tion cases, a word should 
be added about the state action precedents. Cases have 
made clear that the State may not J"encourage" private 
discrimination. In Reitman v. Mulkey the Court held uncon-
stitution a State constitutional amendment which repealed 
legislation prohibiting racial discriimination with respect 
to housing. Toe Ct found it impermissible because it 
"authorized" and "encourages" private discrimination 
by making permissible what was previously impermissible. 
The Ct was careful to say that the question of state involve-
ment in private discrimination is not one susceptible to any 
"infallible test" or per se rule. Instead it requires a 
careful "sifting of the facts and circumstances" to deter-
mine the quality of the State's involvement. In Reitman 
the Ct took a carefult look at the history of housing legis-
lation in California (especially the Unruh bill) and considered 
the impact of the State's action on that basis. This is also 
the course dictated by Wilmington Parking Authority , 365 U.S. 
715. There the Ct held that when a Public Parking Authority 
~ 
leases space to a private restaurant , the private entity 






a discriminatory cafe the state had "elected to place its 
power, property and prestdige behind admitted discrimination." 
Moose Lodge reiterates that evry case must be reviewed on 
its own facts but does indicate that something more thain 
"such necessities of life as electricity, water, and police 
and fire protection" must be involved before j>rivate action 
may become imbued with public involvement. 407 U.S. at 
173. Although the question is open to question, I would 
argue that the provision of textbooks at a time when 
a private school is turning its back on public education 
inlorder to retain the right to discriminate against 
blacks creates a "symbiotic" relationship between 
state and school that the Constitution prohibits. 
II 
If I were authoring the Ct's !opinion I would not 
mention Reitman, Wilmington or Moose Lodge. Instead I 
would rely in the desegregation cases and the obligation 
they impose on the State to stand behind public education, 
an obligation that is not fulfilled by a program that 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE. UNITED srATES ·tocl: J Justioo'J 
R@o1roulated: UN 8 1973 
,,, 7i 7- · 
3rd DRAF 
F1•om: ... 
Delores Norwood !:'t al. l U11 Ap1waJ trorn the l 'mted 
<\ppPllants.. , :-,tatPs District Court for 
I , , l r.· . ' '· the .-.ort 1Prn 1,1stnrt ni 
I> .. L. Harnsoll ~r . et al M1ss1ssi pp1 ,. 
•~ lu1w - - 147'.~ I 
MR. CH mF .) mvr1 c~~ BrntGEli dPl1vPrPd the opinwn l}f 
the Court . 
A three-Judge D1stnc1 ( 'ourt. sustamed thf' vahrt1t, 
of a Mississippi statutory program under which text , 
hooks are purchased by thP '°'tate and lent to studentE> ur 
hoth public and privatf' schools. without reference to 
whether any participating private school has racially 
discriminatory policies. .'Vorwood , Harrison. 340 F , 
~upp. 1003 ( ND Miss rn72 l We not.Pd probable 1uns-· 
rhrtion 410 r· " 
Appellants, who are part>nt~ ot tour :,;chuol ch1ldrpn 
1n Tunica C'oun ty. Mississ1pp1. filed a class act10n 011 
behalf of students throughout Mississippi to en.1oin i11 
part the enforcement of the Mississippi textbook lending· 
program ThP complaint alleged that certain of thf> 
private schools excluded students on the basis of race 
and that, by supplying textbooks to students attendin!! 
such private schools. appellees acting for the State, haVP 
provided direct state aid to racially segregated educa 
t10n . It was also alleged that the textbook aid program 
thereby impeded the process of fully desegregating public 







~'?_-7'7 - <WT'JH ,- -
~ .N ORWOOD " HARTnSO\" 
Private schools 111 M1ssissipp1 have experienced l:I, 
marked growth ill rPcent years. As recently as thP 
1963- Hl64 school year. there were only 17 privatf' schools 
other than Catholic schools; the total enrollmen t was 
2.362 students. :\'irn-- hundred sixteen students m thesr 
1JOnpublic schools were Negro. and 192 of these were ell -
ro11ed in special schoo ls for retarded, orphaned, or aban-
doned children .' By September of 1970, the number of 
private non-Cathohr schools had mcreased to 155 with a. 
student populat1011 estimated at 42,000. virtually all 
white. Appellees do not challenge the statement. whwh 
is fully documented 111 appellants' bnef, that "the crea-
t10n and enlargement of these l pnvate J academH'S or--
curred simultaneously with ma,1or Pvf'nts 111 t ht> rlesegrf-'-
gat1011 of pubhc sehoob 
This case does not raise any 4uestiull as tu tht-- nght ui 
ci t izens to marntarn private schools with admiss10n lun · 
ited to students of particular nat10nal ongrns, race or 
relig10n or of the authority of a State to allow such 
~chools. Piera v Society of Sisters, 268 l' S. 510 
( 1925 ). The narrow issue before us. rather, 1s a par 
t1cular form of tangible assistance the ::,tate provides to 
students m pnvatt-- schools Ill commo11 with all other 13tu 
dents by lendmg textbooks under the :::itate 's 33-year-
old program for providing free textbooks to all the 
rhildren of the State The program dates back to a. 
f940 appeal for unproved educat1011 facilities by the Gov -
ernor of Mississippi to the state legislature. The legisla 
tun• then established a state textbook purchasmg board 
and authorized 1t to select. purchase, and distnbuk 
free textbooks for all school children through the first 
eight grades ' l11 Ul42. the program was extended to 
' .lomt AppC'nd1x, al -W 4 1 
' AppC'llant~• BrlPf , at 1-,- !:J 
•
1 8eP Nnr11·01/// v llnrr1so1, -'"pra . -1-+0 F ~11pp . ;.i 1 JOO~, 
°t'2-·t't~()PiN!<)1~ 
.NOHWOOD 11 , HARRISO 8 
cover all high school students, aud. as codified. the statu~ 
tory authorization remains substantially unchanged . 
§ 6634 et seq., Miss. Code of 1942 
Administrat10n of the textbook program 1s vested in 
the Mississippi Textbook Purchasing Board , whose 1w~m-
bers include the Governor. the State ~uperintendent of 
Education, and three experienced educators appointed by 
the Governor for four-year terms. §§ 6634. 6641. Th r 
Board employs a full-time administrator as its Execu-
trve :Secretary Textbooks may be purchased only "for 
use in those courses set up rn the state course of study 
adopted by the State Board of Education . or courses 
established by special acts of the legislature." ~ 6646 
For each course of study, there is a "ratrng committee" 
composed of appointee! members, § 6641 ( d). and only 
those books approved by the relevant ratmg comm1tter 
may be purchased from publishers at a pnce "not higher 
than the lowest pnces at which the same books are sold 
elsewhere in th e Umted States· • § 6640 ( l) 
The books are kept at a central book repository 1 u 
Jackson. § 6641 ( f J Appellees send to each school dis-
trict, and, m recent. yearf'. to Pach pnvatP school 'rPqu1s1-
, Thr regulation for d1:,:tnbut1011 ot ,;tatP-owr,Prl rf•:--'thook~ I roru 
1940 through 1970 prov1drd a~ followi-
"For thr d1stnbut1on of frpe textbooks thr local control will be 
placed m thr hand~ of t lw County Supermtrndrnt of Educat10n 
All requ1;;it10n:,: for book;; ::;hall be made through him and all sh1p-
mrnt:; of hooks ,;hall be mvo1crd thro11gh him At h1::; d1scret10n hr 
may srt up certam reg11Jat1ons govPrmng th(, d1stnbut10n of book~ 
within the county , such rrgulat1on~ uot to rontt1ct with tlw regula 
tIOl1$ adopted hy tlw :::ltntP TPxthoob Boan1 or prov1:-;1on:,: of th, 
Frer T rxtbook Art. 
The abov<' rpii;11lat1011 wa,, rt>v1spcf 011 Ortolwr 1-1 . 1\:170. 10 rPRrl a~ 
follow~ 
·'Public &hool.-. The admm1:;tratio11 of thP textbook program iu 
the public ;:;chooJ::; ,:;hall be tlw rrspon~1b1J1ty of thr admm1strat1v<' 
hrnrl::, of t!w ro11nt\' 11n11~ . ron;;olidar,,cJ d1,strl('t", and m11111c1pal ~ep-
~:.! ';"i-<lPT~T<W 
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tion forms listrng approved textbooks available from the 
State for free distribution to students. The local school 
district or the privat<:-· school sends a requisit10n form to 
the Purchasing Board for approval by the Executive Sec-
retary, who in turn forwards the approval form to thE->-
Jackson book repository where the order 1s routinely 
filled and the requested books shipped directly to thP 
school district or the private school. 
The Distnct Court found that "34,0UU students an• 
presently receivrng state-owned textbooks while attend-
ing 107 all-white, no11sectana11 pnvatt' schools which 
have been formed throughout the state smce the rncep-
tion of public school desegregat10n." ~40 F. ~upp .. at 
1005. The variat10n Ill the figures as to schools and stu-
dents is accounted for by the District Court 's omiss1011 
of particular kinds of schools 111 making the findmgs 
The earlier and higher figures are found 111 the briefs and 
are not disputed . During the 1970-1971 school year 
these schools held 173,424 books for which Mississ1pp1 
paid $490,23~). The annual expenditurf' for replacement 
or new texts 1s approxnnately $6 per pupil or a total ol 
approximately $207,000 for the students enrolled 111 the 
participating private segregated academies. exclus1w of 
mailing costs which are borne by the State as well 
ln dismissing the complaint the District Court stressed, 
first. that the statutory scheme was not motivated by a 
aratf' d1stncts ,;pt up by thf' Lf"g11;laturf' AJl textbook,, transaction::-
betwfen thf' public schools and thf" Statr shall be earned on through 
them It shall bf thf" duty of thesf' local custodians to render a!J 
reports requJred by tlw State. to plarf' or<lf'r~ for tf'xtbooks for the 
pupils 111 thrir ~choob , , 
"Private &hools. Pr1vate and parochial school programs shall bP 
the responsibility of tlw State Textbook Board AJ! textbook trans-
act10ns will be carr1ed out between the Board and the adm1mstrat1vE> 
heads of these ::;chool8 Thf'1r clut1f'~ :shall op thf' ;;amf' a::- outl11wd 
;1 bovr for p11blir ,srhool,-_ 
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desire to further rac1al segregat1on 111 the public schools , 
having been enacted first in 1940, long before this Court 's 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 
(1954), and consequently, long before there was any 
occasion to have a policy or reason to foster the devei~ 
opment of racially segregated private academ1es. Sec-
ond, the District Court took note that providing text-
books to private sectarian schools had been approved by 
this Court m Board of Education v. Allen, 393 U. 8. :>.36 
(1968), and that ' ' the essential rnquiry, therefore. is 
whether we should apply a more stringent standard for 
determining what constitutes state aid to a school in tht-1 
context of the Fourteenth Amendment 's ban against de-
11ial of equal protectwn that the Supreme Court has 
applied rn the First Amendment caRes. · The District 
Court held no more stringent standard should apply 011 
the facts of th1s case. smce. as 111 Allen, the books werP 
provided to the students and not to the schools Finally 
the District Court concluded tha t the textbook loans d1d 
not interfere w1th or impede the State 's acknowledged 
duty to establish a umtary school system under thiR 
Court's holding 1u Green v. County School Board, :3q I 
(' :;_; 431 , 437 ( u::J68), SJl1Cf 
"Depnvrng any segment of school children of 
state-owned textbooks at this pornt 111 t1me is not 
necessary for the Pstablishment of maintenance of 
state-wide un1tl:iry schools indeed. the publw 
Rchools wh1ch plaiut1ffR acknowledge were fully PS " 
tablished as unitary schools 110 later than 1970--71 
continue to attract 90 o/< of the state 's educable chil -
dren There 1s no showing that any child enrolled 
111 pnvate school. if deprived of free textbooks, would 
withdraw from private school and subsequently Pil. 
roll m t.he 1_>uhh<' -.;chools · 
7:2- i7- 0PT~H l \ -
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Tn Pierce v. Soc,iety of .Si-Ster8 , s'upra. the Court held 
that a State's role in the educat10n of its citizens must. 
yield to the right of parents to provide an equivaleut 
education for their childrf'n iu a privately operated school 
of the parents' choice. In the 1971 Term we reaffirmed 
the vitality of Pierce, Wisconsu1 v Yoder, 406 tT. S. 205 . 
213 ( 1972), aud there has bee11 no suggestion rn thP 
present case that we alter our view of Pierce. Yet the 
Court's holding in Pierce is not without hmits. As MR 
JusTICE WHITE observed 111 his concurring opimon in 
Yo.der, Pierce "held simply that while a State may posit 
[ educational] standards, 1t may not pre-Pm pt the educa-
tional process by req umng ~h1ldrf'n w attend public 
schools.· · 406 G S .. at :23f) 
Appellees fail to recognize the limited scope of Pie;rce 
when they urge that the right of parents to send their 
children to private schools under that holding is at stah 
in this case. The suggest10u is made that the rights of 
parents under Pierce would be underrnrned were the lend-
ing of free textbooks demed to those who attend pnvatt• 
schools-in other words, that school childre11 who attend 
private schools might be deprived of the equal protec-
t10n of the laws were they rnvidiously classified under 
the state textbook loan program simply because their 
parents had exercised the constitutionally protected 
choice to send the children to private schools. 
We do not see the issue in appellees ' terms. In Piera., 
the Court affirmed the right of private schools to exist 
and to operate; it said nothing of any supposed right of 
private or parochial schools to share with public schools 
rn state largesse , on an equal basis or otherwise. It has 
never been held that if private schools are not given 
some share of public funds allocated for education that 
such schools are isolated into a classification violative of 
7:2-77-()PINION 
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the Equal Protection Clause. It is one thrng to say that 
a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private 
schools and quite another to say that such schools must, 
as a matter of equal protection, receive state aid. 
The appellees rntimate that the State must provide 
assistance to private schools equivalent to that it pro., 
vides to public schools without regard to whether the 
private schools discriminate on racial grounds. Clearly, 
the State need not. Even as to church-sponsored schools 
whose policies are nondiscriminatory, any absolute right, 
to equal aid was negated, at least by implication, rn 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. ~- - ( 1971 ). The Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment strictly confine state aid 
to sectaria11 educat1011. Eveu asuming. therefore, that 
the Equal Protection Clause requires state aid to be 
granted to private nonsectarian schools 111 some circum-
stances-health care or textbooks, for example-a State 
could rationally conclude as a matter of legislative policy 
that constitutional neutrality as to sectarian schoolE 
might best be achieved by withholding all state assist 
ance. See San Anto111u i ndependent School District v 
Rodriguez , -- l' :-i - ( 1970) In the same way . a 
State's special mterest in elevatrng the quality of educa-
tion in both pubhc and private schools does not mean 
that the State must grant aid to private schools without 
regard to constitutionally mandated standards forbidding 
state-supported <liscrimmation That the Constitution 
may compel tolerat10n of private discrimination in somt' 
circumstances does not mean that it requires state sup~ 
port for such riiscriminat10ll , 
·1 JI 
The District Court 's holdrng therefore raises the q ues-
tion whether and on what terms a State may-as a matter 
of legislative policy- provide tangible assistance to stu -
dents attenrhng privatf' s<>hools AppPllants assert not_ 
'71-77-0PlNi().r 
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only that the private schools are in fact racially dis-
criminatory, but also that aid to them in any form is i 1J 
derogation of the State's obhgat1on not to support dis-
crimination rn educat1011 
This Court has consistently affirmed decis10ns eujorn--
ing state tuitio11 grants to students attending racially 
discriminatory pn vate schools.' A. textbook lending pro-
gram is not legally distrngmshable from the forms of 
state assistance foreclosed by the prior cases. FreE' 
textbooks, like tuit10n grants directed to pnvate school 
students, are a form of financial assistance 111 uring to the 
benefit of the pnvate schools themselves.'; An mescap-
0 Brown v ;so•uth ( 'arolina Board of Education, 29b F. Supp, HJ\:! 
(SC 1968), aff'd per curiam. ;393 U, S. 222 ( 1968) ; Poindexte1 v 
Louisiana Finance Commission, 275 F. Supp, 833 (ED La. 1967) , 
aff'd per curiam, 389 U S. 571 (1968) See Wallace v. Umted ;statei;, 
389 U. S. 215 ( 1967), aff'g Lee v, M aeon County Board of Educatiou, 
267 F. Supp, 458, 475 (MD Ala, 1967). M1ss1ss1pp1's tu1t1on grant 
programs were mvahdated 111 CojJey and United States v. State 
Educational, Finance Commission, 296 F Supp, 1380 (SD Miss.); 
Coffey and United States v State Educational Finance Commission, 
SD Miss., CA No. 2906, decided Sept. 2, 1970 (unreported) 
Coffey 11 mvolved a statute which provided for tuition loans rather· 
than tmtwn grant~ . 
See Green v. Connally, 3oa F. Supp. ll5U, aff'd sub nom. C01t , 
Green, 404 U. S 602 
"Appellees m1sperre1w the "child benetit ' theory of our cast·::..· 
decided under the Rehgwn Clauses of the First Amendment. Set>, 
e. g,, Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, supra, and 
Board of Education v. Allen. 392 U. S. 236 (1968). In those cases 
the Court observed that the direct financial benefit of textbooks loans 
to students 1s "to parents and children, not to schools,'' Allen, supra, 
at 244, m the sense that parents and children-not ;;chools-would m 
most mstances be required to procure their textbooks 1f the State did 
not. But the Court hat:1 never demed that "free books make 1t 
more likely that t:1ome children choose to attend a sectanan t:1chool, 
ibid., Just as 111 other cases mvolving aid to sectanan schools we have 
acknowledged that the vanous forms of state assistance "sure!~, aid 
those [rehg1ousJ 1m;t1tut10ns 111 the sense that rehgwus bodies 
would otherwise have been forced to find other sources from wh1cfr 
·fi.-77-0PlNi0i\ 
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able educational cost for students 111 both public and 
private schools is the expense of providing all necessary 
learning materials. When, as here, that necessary ex-
pense is borne by the State, the economic consequence 
is to give aid to the enterprise; if the school engages lll 
discriminatory practices the State by tangible aid in the \ 
form of textbooks thereby gives support to such dis-
cnrmnation. Racial discrimination in state-operated 
schools is barred by the Cons ti tu tion and " [ i] t is also 
axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or 
promote private persons to accomplish what it 1s con ° 
sti tu tionally forbidden to accomplish." Lee v. M aco·n 
County, 267 F. Supp. 458, 475 (MD Ala. 1967) 
We do not suggest that a State violates its constitu · 
t10nal duty merely because it has provided any form of 
state service that benefits private schools said _to be ra-· 
cially discrimmatory Textbooks are a basic educational 
tool and, like tuition grants, they are provided only 1t1 
connection with schools; they are to be distinguished 
from generalized services government might provide to 
schools rn common with others Moreover, the text-
books provided to private school students by the StatP 
to finance the8e serv1re8. T1Lto11 \' llichardson, --103 L S. ()7:2, ti7!:J 
"That rehg10n may mdirectly benefit from governmental aid to thP 
:;ecular activitie~ of the churches doe::; not convert that aid mto an 
unpermu,;;ible P,-tabhshment ol religion. Lemon v Kurtzman, .iO:i 
rr 8 o0:2, (:io4 (1!:171) (oprn10n of WHITE,,).) 
The leeway for 111dirert aid to :;rctanan :;chool1:, has no place ui 
definmg the prrm1ss1ble scop<• of ::;tate aid to pnvate racially di,:;-
crun111atory ::;chool1:, ·'State ::;upport of segregated schools through 
any arrangement, management, fund,, or property cannot be squared 
with the lFourteenthJ AmernlmPnt '::; eommand that no State shall 
deny to any per,;;on withrn tts J Lmschct10n the e4ual protect10n o1 
the law;;" Coope1 v Aarou, :35K l 1. S l, l!:J Thu::; l\lR. Ju::;TICE 
WHl'l'E, the author of the Court 's op1111011 111 Allen, supra, and a 
d18senter 111 Lemo11 v. Kurtzmm1, noted thrre that 111 lm, view, leg1::,-
lat1on prov1drng as::;i;;tanr<' to an~· :;ectanau ,-;chool which re;;tncted 
entr} on racial or relig1om, ground,, would to that extent be l1J1t·o11 -. 
stltut10n11J 4();{ ( 1 ~ -- ,it li7 l . n 'L &-,,, Part IV. tnfrri 
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in this case are a for111 ot assistance readily available 
from sources entirely 1ndepemlent of the State-unlike, 
for example, "such necessities of hfe as electricity, water. 
and police and fire protect1011. · J,Jou:,e lodye .\'o . 1117 
,. lrvis, 403 l_;. S lo3. 173 ( 197:2 l. The ::-itate has neither 
an absolute nor operatlllg monopoly on the procurement 
of school textbooks; anyone can purchas<-' them on the 
open markPt. 
The District Court laid great stress 011 the absence of 
showing by appellants that "any child eurolled u1 pri 
vate school if deprived of free textbooks would with -
draw from private schools and subsequently enroll rn thP 
public schools. " We can accept this factual assertion , 
we cannot and do not know. on this record at least. 
whether stat!:' textbook assistance ts the determrnat1ve 
factor rn the enrollment of any students rn any of the 
private schools in Mississippi°. We do not agree with 
the District Court rn its analysis of the legal consequences 
of this uncertainty. for the Constitution does not permit 
the State to aid d1scrimrnat10n evpn whPn there 1s no pre-
cise causal relat10nship betwee11 statP fina11cial aid to a 
private school and the continued well-bemg of that school 
A ::-itate may not grant the type of tangible financial aid } 
here involved if that aid has a s1gmficant tendency to 
facilitate. reinforce, and support private discrimination . 
'' [ D] ecisions 011 thP constitutionality of state 111 volve-
ment in private cliscmmnatio11 do not turn on whethPr 
the state aid adds up to 51 per cent or adds up to only 
4!:l per cent of the support of the segregated w st1t ut1011. 
Poindexter v . Louisiana Financial As.mtance Comm ·ri , 
'275 F . Supp. 833, 854 ( Hl67 1 
The recurring theme of appellees · argument 1s a syrn . 
pathetic one-that the State '1' textbook loan program 1!-! 
' Accord , Grijfi:11 v .Stati-- Board of Education, :29n F t,upp . 117~. 
1181 (ED Va 19(i9) , Hrou•11 v South C'arolrna Board of Educatun,. 
:296 F Supp. :20:-l (SC' 19n8) Contra , Griffin v 8tate Board 1Jj 
Rrlurntum :2:~~ F. Supp .5n0 (Ell V11 19n5) ,~11ppr~Pclrd/ . 
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extended to students who attend racially segregated pri-
vate schools only because the State sincerely wishes to 
foster quality education for all Mississippi children. and 
to that end, has taken steps to insure that no sub-group 
of school children will be deprived of an important ed u-
cationa] tool merely because their parents have chosen 
to enroll them 111 segregated private schools. We ueed 
not assume that the State's textbook aid to private schools 
has been motivated by other than a sincere interest Lil 
the educational welfare of all Mississippi children. But. 
good intentions as to 011e valid obJective do not serve to 
negate the State 's rnvolvement 111 v10lation of a co11st1 
tutional duty . "The existence of a permissible purposP 
cannot sustarn a11 actwn that has an 1mpermissiblP 
effect.'' Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 C. ~ 
451. 462 ( 1972) The Equal Protect10n Clause would 
be a sterile promise if state mvolvement m possible pn-
vate activity could be shielded altogether from consti-
tutional scrutiny simply because its ultimate Pnd wai:-
not discrimination but some higher goal 
The District Court offered as further support for it:-. 
holding the finding that Mississippi's public schools 
"were fully established as urntary schools throughout 
the state no later than 1970---71 [and] continut· to ar.-
tract 90o/c of the state's educable children." 340 F. 
Supp .. at 101:3 We note, however. that overall stat, -
wide attendance figures do not fully and accurately re-
flect the unpact of private schools in particular school 
districts ' In anv Pvent , thP constitutional lllfi.rm1ty nl 
' ln Turnca Count_\. tor t'Xampl e. when· appellants rc,nde, i11 r,-
~pontle to Greeu and Ale:candei. all whitP children were with-
drawn from public school:; and placed m a pnvatP academy hou8ed 
111 local church factl1t1e8 and ,;taffPd by the pnnc1pa l and 17 high 
,:chool t<'acher::< of tlw count ~· :,;y,;tem. who re"1gned 111 m1cl-~·ea r to 
accept Job~ at tlw ne\\' academy SPe l 'mted .Stall',, v Tunica 
('aunty Bd. of Ed .. ~27 F Supp 101!} ( ;'-JD '.\li8,; . 1970), aff'd. 440 
F :!d ;1;n (CA5 1971) A~ of thP tmw ol thP tilmg of th1:; law:;111t 
1 hP ~1.1rre~:,:or T11n1r,1 l 11:st1t11tP ot Lea rn mg f' 11rol1Prl 4!.J."> :st11df'nt~ 
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the Mississippi textbook program is that it sigllifica11t1r/ 
aids the organizat10n and co11tllluat101i of a separatr 
system of private schools which. under the D1stnct Court 
holding, may d1scrimrnate 1f they su dt>sire. A :-\tatP,. 
constitutional obhgat1011 requires 1t to steer clear not 011 I~ 
of the old dual system of racially :segregated schools but 
/ also of gi vrng such aid to rnstitut1011s that practice rac1ai 
or other 1nv1d10us discruni11atw11 !'hat the :-,tate 8 pul,~ 
lie schools are now fully u111tary . as thf' D1strwt ( 'ourr 
found . 1s 1rrt'lf'va11t 
Appellees aud the District, Court alsu place<l great ri-,-
liance oii uur decis10ns rn 8versou v. Hoard uf b'ducatwu , 
330 U. ti. 1, and Board of Education v. Allen, 3g'.2 l'. :-, 
230. lu Everson, we held that the Establishment Clause 
uf the First Amendment did not prohibit :\ew Jersey 
from "spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares o1 
parochial school pupils as part of a general program 
under which it pays the fares of pupils attending pubhe 
and other schools." 330 U. ~-. at 17. Allen, follow111g 
Everson, sustarned a ".\'.t>w York law requirrng :school 
textbooks tu be lent free ut charge to all :student8, 111 
eluding those 111 attenda1icP at parochial schools . 1n 
specified grades 
Neither Allen 110r 8verso11 is dispositive of the issue 
before us Ill this case. RPlig10us schools "pursue two 
goals, religious rnstructio11 and secular education.'' Board 
uf Education v. Allen, supra, 3g:2 C. :-,., at 245. Barring· 
entanglement, States may "provide church-related schools 
with secular, 11eutral or nomdeological services. facilities 
uU white, and would not atte:st to an 01wn enroll mPnt policy. Similar 
h1;;tones of Holmes County, Canton Mumc1pal Separate School Di::;-
tnct, .Jack::;on .\Jun]('lpal Separate School D1;;tnct, Amite County, 
Indianola .\l umc1pal SP para te Sehool D1::;t net, and Grenada M u111c1paf 
Separate School Du,tnct an, recited. without rha!Jmgp hY appellee~ .. 
in A1ipellant,, HnPf. Ht pp I-I- 1\.1 
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or materials, ·· Lemon v Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S. 60:2, 
616, not only because the States have a substantial in -
terest in the quality of education being provided by 
private schools. see Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of 
Education, 281 r S. 370, 375, but more importantly bf'~ 
cause assistance properly confined to the secular func~ 
tions of sectarian schools does not substantially promow 
the readily identifiablP- religious miss10n of those schools 
and it does not interfere with the frN' exE-'rc1sP rights of 
others 
Like a sectanaJJ school, a pn vate school-even 01w 
that discriminates-fulfills an important educational 
function; however , t,he difference is that in the context 
of this case the legitunate educatwnal funct1011 caunot 
he isolated frorn discruninatory practices-if such 111 faet 
exist-since under Brown, supra. discriminatory treat-
ment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educa· 
tional process. The religious teachrng in a sectarian 
school, on the other hand, can be identified and isolated 
from purely neutral secular subjects for purposes of 
channelling state aid . The private school that closes its 
doors to defined groups of students on the basis of cou-
stitutionally suspect criteria manifests, by its own actions, 
that its educational processes are based on private belief 
that segregation 1s desirable in education. There is no 
reason to discriminate against students for reasons wholly 
unrelated to individual ment unless the artificial barriers 
are considered an essential part of the educational mes-
sage to be communicated to the students who are ad-
mitted . ::-,uch private bias 1s not barred by the Con-
st1tutio11 , nor does it invoke any sanction of laws, but 
neither can 1t call on the Constitution for material aid 
from the Statf' 
Our decisions under the Establishment Clause reflect 
the "internal tension m the First Amendment between 
the Establishment Clausf' and the Free Exercise Clause," 
i'l-i"i-< ll-'1 \'10;\ 
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Tilto'II v Richardson, 403 U. ::,_ on, 677. Th1s does not 
mean. as we have already suggested, that a State 1s 
constitutionally obligated to provide even "neutral" serv-
ices to sectarian schools. But the transcendent value of 
:free religious exercise rn our constitut10nal scheme leaves 
room for "play in the Joints" to the extent of cautiously 
delineated secular governmental assistance to relig10us 
schools, despite the fact that such assistance touches on 
the conflicting values of the Establishment Clause by 
ii1directly benefiting the religious schools and their 
sponsors. 
Thus, wh1le the Const1tutio11 does not proscribe 
private bias, it places no value on d1scrimmation as Jt 
does on the values rnherent m the Free Exerc1se Clause. 
Invidious private discriminat1011 may be characterized as 
a form of exercismg freedom of associat10n protected by 
the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded 
affirmative constitutional protections. Aud even some 
private discrimrnation 1s subJect to special remedial legis-
lation in certain circumstances under 9 2 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment; Congress has made such discnmrna-
tion unlawful 111 other significant contexts." Totally 
apart, then, from considerations relating to the separable 
religious funct10ns of sectarian schools the Constitution 
permits a far greater degree of state assistance to sectarian 
schools than it allows to be channelled 111 support of 
private schools if they engage 111 discriminatory practices 
unlawful in a public school system 
\ 
At oral argument, appellees expressed concern over the 
process of determining the scope of relief to be granted 
9 See, e. g., Griffin v Breckinridge, 403 U. S. 88; Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Co., 293 U S. 409; 42 U.S. C. § 2000a et seq . (barrmg 
discrimination m public accommodations); 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq . 
(barring discrimmation m private employment); 42 U S. C. § 3601 
et seq. (barring d1~cnmmat1011 m private housmg transactions) ., 
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should appellants prevail on the merits. That aspect 
of the case presents problems but the procedural details 
need not be fully resolved here. The District Court 
assumption that textbook loans were permissible, even 
to racially discriminating private schools, obviated any' 
necessity for that court to determine whether some of 
the private schools could properly be classified as "ra~ 
cially discrimiuatory" and how that determination might 
best be made. We construe the complaint as contem~ 
plating an individual determination as to each private 
school in Mississippi whose students now receive text-
books under the State 's textbook loan program; relief 
on an assumption that all private schools were discrimi-
nating thus foreclosing individualized consideration would 
not be appropriate 
The proper injunctive relief can be granted without 
implying a finding that all the private schools alleged 
to be receiving textbooks aid are m fact practicing re-
strictive admission policies. Private schools are not 
fungible and the fact that some or even most may prac-
tice discrimination does not warrant blanket condemna-
tion. The District Court can appropriately direct the 
respondents to submit for approval a certification pro-
cedure under which any school seeking textbooks for its 
pupils may apply for participation on behalf of pupils. 
The certification by the school to the Mississippi Text-
book Purchasing Board should. among other factors, 
affirmatively declare its admission policies and prac-
tices, state the number of its racially and religiously 
identifiable minority students and such other relevant 
data as is consistent with this opimon 
This school by school determination may be cumber 
some but no more so than the ::-;tate 's process of ascertain -
ing compliancf' with educational standards. No pre-
sumptions flow from mere allegatwns; no one can bf;' 
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required , consistent with due proces, to prove the ab-
sence of violation of la~-. 
The judgment of the Distnct Court 1s vacated and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opm10n. 
..'in ordPred. 
June 8, 1973 
No. 72-77 Norwood v. Harrison 
Dear Chief: 
Following a discussion with Bill Rehnquist , he sent me a copy 
of his letter of June 7 to you. 
Although I expect to join you, I think Bill's suggestions are 
excellent. 





To: Lawrence A. Hammond Date: June 11, 1973 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 72-77 Norwood v. Harrison 
I understand that you will follow up with the Chief Justice's 
Clerk (Jack Weiss) on the changes being made in this case. 
I would like to be able to join the Chief promptly after the 
opinion is recirculated. Possibly Jack could let you see a copy 
of what he has sent to the printer. 
Incidentally, some of the language on page 9 of the Chief 
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June 13, 1973 
No. 72-77 Norwood v. Harrison 
Dear Chief: 
In accord with the discussion at the Conference this 
morning, I have tried to identify for you the precise referenees 
in your opinion which appear somewhat inharmonious with the 
Religion Cases which may well come down on the same day as this 
case. 
Attached is a copy of your third draft upon which I have 
suggested three changes for your consideration. The general 
thrust of these minor alterations is merely to effect a shift 
of emphasis in Part IV. 
As presently written the section may be read as indicating 
that there is a considerable area in which the state may aid 
church-related schools and that the area in which the State may 
aid private, discriminatory schools is much narrower, In view 
of Nyquist and Levitt, it would be more consistent to indicate 
that however narrow the area of permissible state aid to religious, 
private schools, the area of aid to discriminatory schools is even 
smaller. While this comment is relevant to each of the three 
suggested changes, I add the following brief explanatory statements. 
(1) Page 12. This suggested change performs two functions. 
First, it provides a good spot at which to cite both the Court's 
' ...... , 
- -2-
opinion in Nyquist ( the portion of that opinion dealing with 
maintenance and repair which you have joined) and your 
opinion in Levitt, which I understand will reach a similar 
conclusion. Also, I think it advisable to avoid citation of the 
sentence from your opinion in Lemon since it is that sentence 
upon which New York relied in promulgating its laws in both 
Nyquist and Levitt. While in my view the language you have 
cited is still good law, it cannot be read as expansively as New 
York would have had the Court read it. 
(2) Page 13 • I would delete the sentence in the middle 
of the page. As I read your opinion in Lemon, its thrust is 
that -- because of the dual prohibitions of effect and entanglement --
the State may not be able to isolate the parochial school's secular 
courses from its nonsecular ones. The sentence does not appear 
to be essential to your analysis here. 
(3 ) . Page 14. The suggested alteration here is directed 
only at the general concern I mentioned above. It emphasizes 
the narrowness, rather than the breadth, of State aid to religious 
schools. 
I think you have written a fine opinion in a very delicate 
area, and I am hopeful that, on so important an issue, it will 
command a unanimous Court. With these changes I am glad to 
join, and perhaps Bill Brennan will also join - though r have not 
discussed these suggestions with him. 
The Chief Justice 
LFP/gg 
Sincerely, 
- CHAMBERS OF 
~ttJtrtmt <lfo-url llf tqt ~niltb .:§taftg 
~as!pngLm. ~. QJ. 2!lffe~~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 13, 1973 
Re : No. 72-77 - Norwood v. Harrison 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 






- CHAMBERS OF 
~np-rtnu QJcn:rt cf tfyt ~uililt ~taftg 
';$iulp:ttgtott. ~- <.q. 2.llffe'!~ 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 15, 1973 
Re: No. 72- 77 - Norwood v. Harrison 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
j/. ;;.. /.f. 
The Chief Justice 


























SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE!: The Chief 
Justice 
Ciroulated: ______ _ 
.No. 72- 77 
Reoi.roula.ted: _ IIIM· 1 a 1~71 
Delores Korwood et al.. ] On Appeal from the -United 
Appellants States Distrirt Court for 
z,, the ~orthern District of 
D . L. Harriso11, er ., et al. Mississippi . 
'[June - , 1973J 
MR. CHIEJ? .JusTICE BURGER deliven'd the op1111011 of 
the Court 
A three-judge District Cou rt sustained the validi ty 
of a Mississippi statutory program under ffhich trxt-
books are purchased by the' State and lent to students in 
both public and private schools. without reference to 
whether any participating private school has racially 
discriminatory policies. X orwood v. Harrison , 340 F . 
Supp. 1003 (ND Miss. H-)72 l \Ve not,ed probable juris-
diction . 410 F S -
Appellants, who are parents of four school children 
rn Tunica County, Mississippi, filed a class action on 
behalf of students throughout Mississippi to enjoin in 
part the enforcement of the Mississippi textbook lending 
program. T he complaint alleged that certain of the 
private schools excluded students on the basis of race 
and that. by supplying textbooks to students attending 
such private schools. appellees acting for the 8tate, have 
provided direct state aid to racially segregated educa-
tion . It was also alleged that the textbook aid program 
thereby impeded the process of fully desegregating public 









NORWOOD v. HARRISON 
Private schools in Mississippi have experienced a 
marked growth in recent years. As recently as the 
1963- 1964 school year, there were only 17 private schools 
other than Catholic schools; the total enrollment was 
2,362 students. Nine hundred sixteen students in these 
11onpublic schools were Negro, and 192 of these were en-
rolled in special schools for retarded, orphaned. or aban-
doned children .' By September of 1970. the number of 
private non-Catholic schools had increased to 155 with a 
student population estimated at 42,000, virtually all 
white. Appellees do not challenge the staternen t, which 
is fully documented in appellants' brief, that " the crea-
t10n and enlargement of these [private] academies oc-
curred simultaneously with major events 111 the desegre-
gat10n of public schools . 
This case does not raise any quest1011 as to the ngbt of 
citizens to mamtam private schools with adn11ss10n hm-
1ted to students of particular nat,io11al ongms. race or 
religion or of the authority of a State to allow such 
schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 C S. 510 
( 1925) Th e narrow issue before us. ratlwr. 1s a par-
ticular form of tangible assistance the ~tate provides to 
students 111 private schools in common wi th all other stu-
dents by lending textbooks under the ;,tate's 33-year-
old program for providing free textbooks to all the• 
children of the State The program dates back to a. 
1940 appeal for improved ed ucation facilities by the Gov-
ernor of Mississippi to the state legislature. The legisla-. 
ture then established a state textbook purchasing board 
and authorized 1t to select, purchase, and distribute 
free textbooks for all school children through the first 
eight grades " In 1942, the program was extended to: 
' .J omt Appendix, at 40---41 
' Appellant~' Brief, at 8-9. 
' F;pp Norn·onr( v. Harriso11 . supra, :140 F Supp., at 1007., 
72-77-0PINI0N 
NORWOOD v . HARRISON 3 
cover all high school students, and, as codified, the statu-
tory authorization remains substantially unchanged. 
s 6634 et seq., Miss. Code of 1942. 
Administration of the textbook program 1s vested in 
the Mississippi Textbook Purchasing Board, whose mem-
bers include the Governor. the State Superintendent of 
Education . and three experienced educators appointed by 
the Governor for four-year terms. ~~ 6634, 6641. The 
Board employs a full-time administrator as its Execu-
tive Secretary. Textbooks may be purchased only "for 
use in those courses set up in the state course of study 
adopted by the State Board of Education, or courses 
established by special acts of the legislature. " ~ 6646. 
For each course of study. there 1s a "rating committee '' 
composed of appointed members. ~ 6641 ( d), and only 
those books approved by the relevant ratrng committee 
may be purchased from publishers at a pnce "not higher 
than the lowest prices at which the same books are sold 
elsewhere in the United States." ~ 6646 (l) . 
The books are kept at a central book repository in 
.Jackson. § 6641 (f) . Appellees send to each school dis-
tn ct, and , UJ recent years, to each privatP school " requis1-
' The regulat10u for d1:,: t nlrn tlUtt ol ,;t H1 P-o\\· 11c•d t l'\T hook~ t rorn 
1940 through 1970 prov id ed a:o follow::.. 
"For the distribution of free textbooks the loca l control will be 
placed 1u the hands of the Count ) Supenntendf'nt of Education . 
All requi81t10ns for books shall be made through hnn and all ship-
mf' nts of book:,; shall bf' mvorced through hnn. At his discretion he 
may srt up cert a m regulat10n:; governmg the dist nbution of books 
within the co unty , such regulations not to c-onfl1ct with the regula-
tions adopted by thf' State Textboob Board or prov1s10n:,: of thf' 
F'rf'e TPxtbook Act,· 
Thf' above regulat1011 wa,-; rf•viserl on October H . l!:)70, to read a,, 
follow~ 
'' Public Schools. Tlw aclm1111stra tion of the textbook program in 
the public schools shall be thf' respon~1bility of the adm1mstrative 
l1Par!,; of the count~· nrnt ,;, co n,;ol1dated districts. and murncipa l sep-
4 
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tion forms hstmg approved textbooks available from the· 
State for free distribution to students. The local school 
district or the private school sends a requisition form to 
the Purchasing BoarJ for approval by the Executive Sec-
retary. whu Ill turn forwards the approval for m to the 
Jacksoll book repository where t he order 1s rnutinely 
filled and the requested books shipped directly to the 
school district or the private schuul 
The District Court found that "34,000 students are · 
presently receiving state-owned textbooks while attend-
1ng 107 all-white, nonsectarian private schools which 
nave been formed throughout the state smce tlw incep-
t1011 of public school descgregatw11 " ;H(I F ::-,upp., at 
1005 Tlw vanat1011 ll t ht· hgures a::; tu , " h ,-, a11d l-itU-
dents 1s accounted for tJy the D1stn ct (\>urt,'s orn iss10n 
of particular kinds of schools in makmg the fincirnirs. 
The earlier and higher figures are found rn the bnefs and 
are not disputed. During the 1970--1971 school year, 
these schools held 173,424 books for which Mississippi 
paid $490,239. The annual expenditurr for replacement 
or new texts 1s approximately $6 per pupil or a total of 
approximately $207,000 for the students curolled ui t he 
participating private segregated academie:o. 1'•xcl11sivt' nt 
mailing costs which are bonw by the ::,tat(• as well 
fn dismissing the complaint the District Court stressed, 
first. that the statutory schenw was not motivated by a 
arate districts 8et up b_\· the Legrnlature. All textbooks transactions 
between the public schools and the State ::,hall be earned on through 
them It shall be the duty of these local cu,;todians to render all 
report,; required by the State ; to plarP order8 for textbooks for the 
pupil:, m their schoob , 
"Private Schools. Private and parochial ~chool programs shall be 
rhe respons1btl1ty of the State Textbook Board All textbook trans-
act10ns will be earned out bPtween the Board and the adm1111strat1ve 
heads of these schools Their dut1P~ ~halJ be the ~ame a~ outlmed -·. 
nhoVP for p11blir ~chool~ 
72-77-0PINIOK 
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desire to further racial segregat10n 111 the public schools, 
having been enacted first in 1940, long before this Court 's 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 
( 1954), and consequently. long before there was any 
occasion to have a policy or reason to foster the devel-
opment of racially segregated private academies. Sec~ 
ond, the District Court took note tha t providing t ext-
books to private sectarian schools had been approved by 
this Court m Hoard of Education \·. Allen . 393 r. S. 236 
( 1968; , and that "the essential mquin. therefore, is 
whether we should apply a more stringent standard for 
determrning what constitutes state aid to a school in the 
context of the Fourteenth Amendmcut 's ban agamst de-
nial of equal protectwn that the ::-:luprel'le Court ha::-
applied m the First Amendment cases. · Th e Dif,,t n rt 
Court held no more stringent standard should apply on 
the facts of this case. since, as in Allen , the books were 
provided to the students and not to the 13chools Finally , 
the District Court concluded that the textbook loalls did 
nut interfere with or 1rnpede the ~tate's acknowledged 
duty to establish a ullltary school system under this 
( :ourt 's holding m Gree,, \ County 8chool Board, 391 
(' ~ 431 , 437 / 196~ ) SJl1Ct' 
"Deprivrng any segment of school children of 
"tate-ow11ed textbooks at this pornt Ill time is not 
necessary for the establishment of maintenance of 
state-wide unitary schools. lndeed, the public 
~chools which plaintiffs ackuowledge were fully es-
tablished as unitary schools no later than 1970---71 
continue to attract 90% of the state's educable chil-
dren. There 1s no showing that any child enrolled 
ll1 private school, if deprived of free textbooks, would 
withdraw from private school and subsequently en ,-. 
roll 111 the rrnblir srhools · 
6 
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II 
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, the Court held 
that a State's role in the education of its citizens must 
yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent 
education for their children in a privately operated school 
of the parents ' choice. In the 1971 Term we reaffirmed 
the vitality of Pierce, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
213 (1972) , and there has been no suggestion in the 
present case that we alter our view of Pierce . Yet the 
Court's holding in Pierce is not without limits. As MR. 
JusTICE WHITE observed in his concurring opinion in 
Yo.der , Pierce "held simply that while a State may posit 
I educational] standards, it may not pre-empt the educa-
twnal process by requiring children to attend public 
schools. '' 406 U. S., at 239. 
Appellees fail to recognize the limited scope of Prnrce 
when they urge that the right of parents to send their 
children to private schools under that holding is at stake 
in this case. The suggestion is made that the rights of 
parents under Pierce would be undermined were the lend-
ing of free textbooks denied to those who attend private 
schools-in other words, that school children who attend 
private schools might be deprived of t he <'qual protec-
tion of the laws were they invidiously classified under 
the state textbook loan program simply becau:~e their 
par en ts had exercised the cons ti tu tionally protected 
choice to send the children to private schools. 
We do not see the issue in appellees· terms. In Pierce, 
the Court affirmed the right of private schools to exist 
and to operate; it said nothing of any supposed right of 
private or parochial schools to share with public schools 
fn state largesse, on an equal basis or otherwise. It has 
never been held that if private schools are not given 
some share of public funds allocated for education that 
such schools are isolated into a classification violative of 
72-77-0PINION 
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the Equal Protection Clause. lt is one thing to say that 
a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private 
schools and quite another to say that such schools must, 
as a matter of equal protection, receive state aid . 
The appellees intimate that the State must provide 
assistance to private schools equivalent to that it pro-
vides to public schools without regard to whether the 
private schools discriminate on racial grounds. Clearly, 
the State need not. Even as to church-sponsored schools 
whose policies are nondiscriminatory, any absolute right 
to equal aid was negated. at least by implication, in 
Lem,on v. Kurtzman, 403 CS. - ( 1971 ). The Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendme nt strictly confine state aid 
to sectarian educat10n. Eveu asumrng. thC'refore. that 
the Equal Protection Clause requires state aid to be 
granted to private nonsectarian schools in some circum-
stances-health care or textbooks. for example-a State 
could rationally conclude as a matter of legislative policy 
that constitutional neutrality as to sectarian schools 
might best be achieved by withholding all state assist-
ance. See San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, - C S. ·- ( HJ73 ; In the same ,vay, a 
State 's special wterest in elevating the quality of educa-
t1011 in both public and private schools does 11ot mean 
that the State must grant aid to private schools without 
regard to constitutionally mandated standards forbidding 
state-supported discrimination . That the Constitution 
may compel toleration of private discrimination in some. 
circumstances does not mean that it requires state sup-
port for such discnmrnat10n , 
HT 
The District Court 's holding therefore raises the ques~ 
tion whether and on what terms a State may-as a matter 
of legislative policy-provide tangible assistance to stu-
dents attending private schools . Appellants assert not 
o/2-77-0P!NI0 
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only that the private schools are 111 fact racially dis-
criminatory, but also that aid to them in any form is in 
derogation of the State's obligat10n not to support dis-
crim111at10n in education 
This Court has consistently affirmed decis10ns enjoin-
ing state tuition grants to students attending racially 
discriminatory private schools.'' A textbook lending pro-
gram is not legally distinguishable from the forms of 
state assistance foreclosed by the prior cases. Free 
textbooks, like tuition grants directed to private school 
students, are a form of financi al assistance inuring to the 
benefit of the private schools thcmselvPs." An rnescap-
" Brown v. :::iouth Carolina Board oJ Ectucatw11, :29ti .F . Supp. 199 
(SC 1968), aff'd per curiam. :393 U. S. 222 (19fiSJ, Pomdexter v. 
Louisiana Finance Commission, 275 F. Supp. 8:3:3 (ED L,1. 1967), 
aff'd per curia.m. 389 U S. 571 (1968). See H'allace v. Cnited States , 
389 U.S. 215 (1967), aff'g Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 
267 F . Supp. 458, 475 (MD Ala . 1967) . Mississippi 's t uition grant 
programs were invalidated in Coffey and United States v. State 
Educational Finance Commiss1011, 296 F Supp. 1380 (SD '.\Iis,;.) ; 
Coffey and United States v. State Educational F111a11ce Commission, 
SD l\I1ss. , CA No. 2906, derided Srpt. :! , 1970 (unreported) . 
Coffey fl mvolYed a ~tatute which provided tor tuit10n loan~ rnther· 
than t u1t10n grant~. 
See Oree11 , . Connally, 303 F. Supp. 1150, alf 'd sub uom. Coil " · 
Green. 404 U. S 602. 
<; Appellees misperceive the '·child benefit" theo ry of our case~ 
decided under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. See, 
e. g., Cochran v. Louis1:ana State Board of Education. supra, and 
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). In those cases 
the Court observed that the direct financial benefit of textbooks loanb 
to st udents 1s "to parents and children, not to schools," Allen . supra, 
at 244, 111 the sense that parents and children-not schoob-would in 
most mstances be req uired to procure their textbooks 1f the State did 
not . But the Court has never demed that "free books make it 
more likely that ,;ome children choose to attend a secta nan school, '' 
ibid., just as rn other cases rnvolving a id to secta n an schools we have 
acknowledged that the various forms of stat e as1:,1stancc '·surely aid 
those Lrelig10us] m1:,titut10ns in the sense that religious bodies 
would_ otherwise have been forced to find other source$ from which: 
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able educational cost for students in both public and 
private schools is the expense of providing all necessary 
learning materials. When, as here, that necessary ex-
pense is borne by the State, the economic consequence 
1s to give aid to the enterprise; if the school engages iii 
discriminatory practices the State by tangible aid in the 
form of textbooks thereby gives support to such dis-
crimination. Racial discrimination in state-operated 
schools is barred by th e Constitut ion and " [i]t is also 
axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or 
promote private persons to accompli sh what it is cona 
stitutionally forbidden to accomplish .'' Lee v. Macon 
County, 267 F. Supp. 458, 475 (M D Ala. 1967) . 
We do not suggest that a State violatt'S its constitu-
tional duty merely because it has provided an y fo rm of 
state service that benefits private schools said to be ra-
cially discriminatory. Textbooks are a basic educational 
tool and , like tuition grants. they are provided only in 
connection with schools; they are to be dist inguished 
from generalized services government might provide to 
schools in common with others. Moreover, the text-
books provided to private school st udenti:, by the State 
to finance these ~crv1ces. " Tilton v R1chards011. 403 l' . S. 672, 679. 
•· That rehg10n may mdirectl y benefi t from governmental aid to the 
secular act1vit1es of the churches does not convert that a id into an 
impermissibl e esta blishment of rehg10 11. '' Lem011 v. K urtzman, 403 
l' S. 602, 664 (1971) (opinion of WHITE, J. ) . 
The leeway for mdirect a id to sectanan schools has no place in 
definmg the permissible scope of ;; tate aid to private raciall_1· dis-
cnmmatory schools. "State support of segregated schools through 
any arrangement , management , funds or property cannot be squared 
with the [Fourteenth] Amendment 's command that no State shall 
deny to any person withm its junsdiction the equal protection of 
the Jaws.'' Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 19 Thus MR. JusTICE 
WHI'l'E, the aut hor of the Court 's opmion 111 Allen, supra, and a 
dissent er in Lemon v. Kurtzman, noted there that m his view, legis-
lation providing assistance to anY sectana n school which restri cted 
ent ry on racial or relig10us grounds would to tha t extent be uncon-. 
st1tut10nal. 40:-l U S. , at 671 , n . 2. See Part IV, infra. 
10 
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in this case are a form of assistance readily available 
from sources entirely independent of the State-unlike, 
for example, "such necessities of life as electricity, water, 
and police and fire protection." Moose Lodge 1Yo. 107 
v. Irvis, 403 U.S. 163, 173 (1972). The State has neither 
an absolute nor operating monopoly on the procurement 
of school textbooks; anyone can purchase them on the 
open market. 
The District Court laid great stress on the absence of 
showing by appellants that "any child enrolled in pri-
vate school if deprived of free textbooks would with-
draw from private schools and subsequently enroll in the 
public schools." We can accept this factual assertion : 
we cannot and do not know, 011 this rf'cord at least , 
whether state textbook assistance is the determmativf' 
factor in the enrollment of any students in any of the 
private schools in Mississippi. We do not agree with 
the District Court in its analysis of the legal consequences 
of this uncertainty, for the Constitution does not permit 
the State to aid discrimination even when there is no pre-
cise causal relationship between state fi 11a11cial aid to a 
private school and the contrnu ed well -licillg of th at school 
A State may not grant th e type of tangibl e financial aid 
here involved if that aid has a significant tendency to 
facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination. 
"[D]ecisions on the constitutionality of state involve-
ment in private discrimination do not turn on whether 
the state aid adds up to 51 per cent or adds up to only 
49 per cent of the support of the segregated institution." 
Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Cornrn'n, 
275 F. Supp. 833, 854 ( 1967) 1 
The recurring theme of appellees ' argument 1s a sym-
pathetic one-that the State's textbook loan program is 
7 Accord , Griffin v State Board of Education. 296 F. Supp. 1178, 
1181 (ED Va . 1969) ; Brown v. South Carolina Board of Education. 
296 F . Supp. 203 (SC 1968). Contra, Griffin v. State Board of 
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extended to students who attend racially segregated pri-
vate schools only because the State sincerely wishes to 
foster quality education for all Mississippi children, and, 
to that end, has taken steps to insure that no sub-group 
of school children will be deprived of an important edu-
cational tool merely because their parents have chosen 
to enroll them in segregated private schools. ,Ve need 
not assume that the State's textbook aid to private schools 
has been motivated by other than a sincere interest in 
the educational welfare of all Mississippi children. But 
good intentions as to one valid objective do not serve to 
negate the State's involvement in violation of a consti-
tutional duty. "The existence of a permissible purpose 
cannot sustain an action that has an unpermissible 
effect.' ' Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 lJ S. 
451 , 462 (1972) . The Equal Protection Clause would 
be a sterile promise if state involvement in possible pri-
vate activity could be shielded altogether from consti-
tutional scrutiny simply because its ultimate end was 
not discrimination but some higher goal. 
The District Court offered as furth er support for its 
holding the finding that Mississippi 's p ublic schools 
"were fully established as unitary schools throughout 
the state no later than H)70-71 land] continue to at-
tract 90% of the state's educable children." 340 F . 
Supp. , at 1013. We note. however, that overall state-
wide attendance figures do not fully and accurately re-
flect the impact of private schools in particular school 
districts.' In any event, the constitutional infirmity of 
• ln Tunica Count y, for example, where appell ants reside, in re-
~ponse to Green and Alexander, all whit e children were with-
drawn from public schools and placed in a private academy housed 
m local church facilities and staffed by the principal and 17 high 
,:chooJ teachers of the county system, who resigned in mid-year to 
accept Jobs at the new academy. See United States v. Tunica 
County Bd. of Ed., 327 F. Supp. 1019 (ND Mis~. 1970) , aff'd , 440 
F 2d 337 (CA5 1971) As of the time of the filmg of this lawsuit , 
the Rucrcssor Tunica Institute of Lea rnmg enrolled 495 students, 
l~ 
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the Mississippi textbook program is that it significantly 
aids the organization and continuation of a separate 
system of private schools which, under the District Court 
holding, may discriminate if they so desire. A State's 
constitutional obligation requires it to steer clear not only 
of the old dual system of racially segregated schools but 
also of giving such aid to institutions that practice racial 
or other mvidious discrimination. That the t::;tate's pub-
lic schools are now fully unitary. at-- the District Court 
founrl , IR irrelevant. 
rv 
Appellees and the District Court also placed great re-
liance on our decisions in Everson v. Board of Education, 
330 U. S. 1, and Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 
236. In Everson, we held that the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment did not prohibit ~ew Jersey 
from "spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of 
parochial school pupils as part of a general program 
under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public 
and other schools. " 330 U. S., at 17. Allen, following 
Everson, sustained a New York law requiring school 
textbooks to be lent free of charge to all students, in-
cluding those 111 attendance at parochial schools, in 
specified grades. 
Neither Allen nor Everson is dispositive of the issue 
before us in this case. Religious schools "pursue two 
goals, religious instruction and secular education. " Board 
of Education v. Allen, supra, 392 U. S., at 245. And, 
where carefully limited rn as to avoid the prohibitions 
of the "effect'' and "entanglement" tests, States may 
all white, and would not attest to an open enrollment policy. Similar 
lnstories of Holmes County, Canton Municipal Separate School Dis-
trict, Jackson Municipal Separate School District, Amite County, 
Indianola Municipal Separate School District , and Grenada Municipal 
Separate School District are recited, without challenge by appellees . 
in Appellant'"' ' Brief. at pp. 14-19 
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assist church-related schools in performing their secular ( 
functions, Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
post, at 16-17; Levitt v. Committee for Public E<duoation, 
post, at -,not only because the States have a substantial 
interest in the quality of education being provided by 
private schools, see Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of 
Education, 281 U. S. 370, 375, but more importantly be-
cause assistance properly confined to the secular func-
tions of sectarian schools does not substantially promote 
the readily identifiable religious mission of those schools 
and it does not interfere with the free exercise rights of 
others. 
Like a sectarian school, a private school-even one 
that discriminates-fulfills an important educational 
function; however. the difference is that in the context 
of this case the legitimate educational funct1011 cannot 
be isolated from discriminatory practices-if such in fact 
exist-since under Brown, supra, discriminatory treat-
ment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educa-
tional process. The private school that closes its doors 
to defined groups of students on the basis of con-
stitutionally suspect criteria manifests, by its own actions, 
that its educational processes are based on private belief 
that segregation is desirable in education. There is no 
reason to discriminate against students for reasons wholly 
unrelated to individual merit unless the artificial barriers 
are considered an essential part of the educational mes-
sage to be communicated to the students who are ad-
mitted. Such private bias is not barred by the Con-
stitution, nor does it invoke any sanction of laws, but 
neither can it call on the Constitution for material aid 
from the State. 
Our decisions under the Establishment Clause reflect 
the "internal tension in the First Amendment between 
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, " 
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mean, as we have already suggested, that a State is 
constitutionally obligated to provide even "neutral" serv-
ices to sectarian schools. But the transcendent value of 
free religious exercise in our constitutional scheme leaves 
room for "play in the joints" to the extent of cautiously 
delineated secular governmental assistance to religious 
schools, despite the fact that such assistance touches on 
the conflicting values of the Establishment Clause by 
indirectly benefiting the religious schools and their 
sponsors. 
Thus, while the Constitution does not proscribe 
private bias. it places no value on discrimination as it 
does on the values inherent in the Free Exercise Clause. 
Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as 
a form of exercising freedom of association protected by 
the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded 
affirmative constitutional protections. And even some 
private discrimination is subj ect to special remedial legis-
lation in certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment; Congress has made such discrimina-
tion unlawful in other significant contexts." However 
11arrow may be the channel of permissible state aid to 
sectarian schcfols, Nyquist, supra; Levitt, supra, it per-
mits a greater degree of state assistance than may be 
given to private schools which engage in discriminatory 
practices that would be unlawful in a public school 
system. 
At oral argument, appellees expressed concern over the 
process of determining the scope of relief to be granted 
9 See, e. g. , Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U. S. 88; Jones v. Alfred 
I-1. Mayer Co. , 293 U. S. 409; 42 U.S. C. §2000a et seq. (barring 
discrimination in public accommodations); 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 
(barring discrimination in private employment); 42 US. C. § 3601 
et seq. (barring discrimination in private housing transact10ns) . 
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~hould appellants prevail on the merits. That aspect 
of the case presents problems but the procedural details 
need not be fully resolved here. The District Court 
assumption that textbook loans were permissible, everi 
to racially discriminating private schools, obviated any 
necessity for that court to determine whether some of 
the private schools could properly be classified as "ra~ 
cially discriminatory" and how that determination might 
best be made. We construe the complaint as contem-
plating an individual determination as to each private 
school in Mississippi whose students now receive text-
books under the State's textbook loan program; relief 
on an assumption that all private schools were discrimi-
nating thus foreclosing individualized com:ideration would 
not be appropriate. 
The proper injunctive relief can be granted without 
implying a finding that all the private schools alleged 
to be receiving textbooks aid are in fact practicing re-
strictive admission policies. Private schools are not 
fungible and the fact that some or even most may prac-
tice discrimination does not warrant blanket condemna-
tion. The District Court can appropriately direct the 
respondents to submit for approval a certification pro-
cedure under which any school seeking textbooks for its 
pupils may apply for participation on behalf of pupils. 
The certification by the school to the Mississippi Text-
book Purchasing Board should, among other factors, 
affirmatively declare its admission policies and prac-
tices, state the number of its racially and religiously 
identifiable minority students and such other relevant 
data as is consistent with this opinion. 
This school by school determination may be cumber-
some but no more so than the State's process of ascertain-
ing compliance with educational standards. No pre-
sumptions flow from mere allegations; no one can be 
72-77-0PINION 
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required , consistent with due proces, to prove the ab-
sence of violation of law.' 
The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
So ordered. 
- CHAMBERS OF 
.§u:p-rtnr.e <Q:cu.rt of tfr.e 'Jllttitt~ .§tattG 
~aa-Iyhtgfott, ~. <Q:. 2.0,5,iJ / 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. June 19, 1973 
RE: No. 72-77 Norwood v. Harrison 
Dear Chief: 
I have somewhat the same reservations about your 
opinion in the above as I expressed in my memorandum 
to you in Levitt. I repeat that I don't believe that the 
Court has ever specifically held that a sectarian school 
may itself be r eimbursed by a State for its services -
secular or otherwise. It seems to me that your sugges-
tion at pages 12 and 13 that "where carefully limited so 
as to avoid the prohibitions of the 'effect' and 'entangle-
ment' tests, States may assist church-related schools in 
performing their secular functions" suggests the contrary 
Therefore, would you mind please noting at the foot of the 
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- June 19, 1973 
No. 72-77 Norwood v. Harrison 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 20, 1973 
Re: No. 72-77 - Norwood v. Harrison 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your opinion. 










- CHAMBERS OF" THE CHIEF" JUSTICE 
;§u.prtntt (!J~ of t4t 'Jllnitt~ .:%t1dtll 
'Jlllrudpnghtn. J. <q. 2llffe)!~ 
June 20, 1973 
Re: No. 72-77 - Norwood v. Harrison 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
To make explicit what was implicit, I am adding 
a sentence at the end of the last complete para-
graph on page 15 as follows: 
"The State's determination [ of 
eligibility] would, of course, be 
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CHAMBERS 01' 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 
June 20, 1973 
Dea.r Chief: 
In 72-77, Norwood v. Harrison 
.woµl.d you note I concur in the resul.t7 
•· \ru~ 
William O. Douglas 
The Chief~Justice I 
cc: The Conference 
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